

TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF SANCTIONS

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INTRODUCTION

Critical theory of international relations questions the assumptions and values that the traditional theorists and practitioners in the field utilize to formulate their opinions and policies. Feminist theory questions the exclusion of non-masculine perspectives from the development and manufacturing of knowledge. The overlap of these philosophical viewpoints gives birth to feminist international relations theory, which questions the exclusion of non-masculine perspectives from the manufacturing of international relations theory and practice.

Other scholars have explored the relationship between feminist thought and international relations theory. Feminist peace theorists and activists argued that the inclusion of womyn's¹ perspectives would lead to a more peaceful world as early as the 1920's. Jane Addams won the Nobel Peace Prize during the First World War in part for her activism for peace as the choice that womyn would make in foreign policy in order to avoid mass destruction. More recently, theorists like Betty Reardon, in her book, *Sexism and the War System*, explored the gendered nature of the existence of war. Their ideas were predecessors to a scholarship of feminist international relations theory, developing in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Leading this trend was J. Ann Tickner, who wrote a book entitled *Gender in International Relations*, which explained the gendered nature of the international political arena and suggests ideas and methods that might remedy this problem in international security, political economy, and environmental analysis. Since Professor Tickner's book was published, many in the feminist and international relations theory

¹ In this project, I use the words "womyn" and "wymyn" as opposed to "woman" and "women," in recognition that the terms, as traditionally spelled, are connotative of subordination of womyn to man. these spellings, for me, also represent rejection of the

communities have reacted to the ideas contained therein, and from these thoughts has evolved a feminist literature on international relations theory.

*Lit review!!!!

The feminist international relations theory literature critiques many of the policies, institutions, exclusions, and ideas of the government of the modern nation-state, generally, and the United States, specifically*. Feminists have written critiques of development, security, sovereignty, and war as they evaluate those aspects of international relations policy that seem particularly non-feminine to their sensibilities*. They have also critiqued realism, neo-realism, and liberalism as theories of international relations that are exclusive, hierarchical, and particularly violent. This critique literature provides a basis to look at policy formation, policy choice, and policy implementation from a point of view that assumes the values of feminist theory.

It is in a feminist outlook on policy choice that we find the specific purpose of this project. This project rises out of the question of how a feminist international relations viewpoint would inform specific policy choices within the context of government and diplomacy. In order to answer that question, I have chosen to outline the ideas of a feminist epistemology of international relations theory, and to apply those ideas to the policy choice of economic sanctions. Economic sanctions, for the purpose of this evaluation, will be defined as measures taken by one government, group of governments, or international institution, to decrease trade with a nation in response to some non-economic behavior on the part of the sanctioned nation.

Economic sanctions, as a policy, have been chosen by the United States in numerous situations involving relations and communications problems with other nations. The United Nations, following the United States' lead, has also chosen to employ economic sanctions as a tool to encourage compliance with international norms of state behavior. This project deals with

the issue of economic sanctions for three key reasons. First, the evaluation of economic sanctions policy is a practical choice, as the option to apply economic sanctions in a particular international conflict arises as a policy option often in the post-Cold War world. Additionally, activist campaigns to end sanctions combined with other academic criticisms leave sanctions on the discussion board, formally or informally, most of the time. The second reason that this project evaluates economic sanctions as a policy choice is the complexity of the decision calculus concerning the specific issue. A feminist viewpoint choosing whether or not to declare war on a nation that has neither acted in or indicated aggression, for example, would be clear. The feminist would generally find that to be an unjustified policy choice. As you will see in Chapters 2 and 3, the issue of sanctions is not as clear. The arguments on either side are dramatic and compelling to many people. As a result, the policy choice of sanctions is a very difficult one to sort out, even absent feminist ideas. The final reason for the choice of economic sanctions is the centrality of the issues that the sanctions debate deals with to the clash between traditional and feminist theories of international relations. The sanctions debate, even in the normal policy arena, brings to the table issues of sovereignty, securitization, and cost-benefit analysis. These are a few of the important areas in which the feminist idea of international relations would diverge from the policy prescriptions of traditional policy-making theory and practice.

Having chosen sanctions as the policy to evaluate, I structured this project to exposit the issues in a way that compared the status quo political arguments for and against the policy to those that could be made by a feminist epistemology of international relations. I began by constructing a feminist viewpoint concerning international policy-making. This perspective comes from the convergence of many feminist theorists who have written on the subject of gendered lenses in international relations theory, and weaves their ideas and mine into four criteria by which a feminist viewpoint would judge theory and policy in the international arena. I do not claim this to be an exhaustive exploration of feminist international relations theory, nor a comprehensive conclusion as to what a feminist epistemology of international relations would

include. I realize the limitations of this project as a BA thesis, and I know that only by expansion could these analyses be applied to areas of international relations theory not specifically dealt with in this project. The four areas of evaluation to be used for this project, or principles that govern a feminist epistemology of international relations, are outlined in Chapter 1.

Chapters 2 and 3 are dedicated almost completely to the political and academic debates concerning economic sanctions that occur in the status quo. This part of the paper outlines the justifications and reasons for economic sanctions used by those governments who implement them, as well as the arguments made by sanctions' political opponents. In this section, you will notice a focus on the case study of Iraq. This is intentional on my part. I chose to deal mostly with the instance of Iraq for a few reasons. First, Iraq is by far the most controversial imposition of sanctions among the American public, and this controversy has caused the arguments for and against the sanctions to be more publicly debated, and more well articulated. Second, both the reasons for sanctions and the arguments against sanctions in Iraq are representative of the divisions concerning other instances of sanctions, but extreme representations. The polarization of the issues in this instance of sanctions will make the arguments on both sides of the debate more clear. Despite the use of the case study of Iraq, I argue that these ideas apply to economic sanctions generally. In order to support this argument, I reference arguments about other instances of the application of economic sanctions, as well as general sanctions theory.

Chapter 4 integrates the feminist epistemology outlined in Chapter 1 with the sanctions debate in Chapters 2 and 3 to formulate a feminist international relations-focused evaluation of sanctions policy. In this Chapter, I develop the application of the four principles of feminist international relations theory to the policy choice of whether or not to apply economic sanctions. Chapter 4 focuses on sanctions policy, detailing an evaluation independent of alternatives. Chapter 5 then looks at how the principles of feminist international relations theory could be applied to the political situations that prompted the policy choice of economic sanctions, in order to develop policy in the spirit of a feminist viewpoint of international relations. As I mentioned

before, the study of the principles of feminist international relations collects four principles used to evaluate sanctions policy. When one examines sanctions policy for compliance with the feminist ideas of comprehensive accounts of international affairs, treatment of power in the international arena, prioritization of the goal of genuine peace, and awareness of women's rights concerns, economic sanctions do not measure up to the standards of a feminist critique of international relations theory. Instead, a feminist critique of international relations theory suggests that policy-makers act in coordination with its principles for a more ethical, effective, and humane solution to international relations difficulties involving sanctioned nations.

CHAPTER 1. PRINCIPLES THAT GOVERN A FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the articulation of a feminist epistemology of international relations theory, I begin with the recognition that there exist many feminist perspectives that, when examined separately, contribute a diverse and potentially contradictory variety of ideas to a feminist epistemology of international relations. This divergence is in principle completely acceptable and a natural result of any comprehensive body of critical rethought, as the process of questioning the norms often brings up conflicting answers. However, for the purposes of policy analysis, I have chosen to select the convergences between these perspectives, to bridge these concepts with my reflections, and to utilize those convergences to analyze the policy choices at issue. J. Ann Tickner, in a feminist critique of political realism, lets her readers know that she is “deeply aware that there is no one feminist approach but many, which come out of various disciplines and intellectual traditions. Yet there are common themes in the different feminist literatures that I have reviewed which could help us begin to formulate a feminist epistemology of international relations.”² My

² J. Ann Tickner “Hans Morganthau’s Principles of political realism: a reformulation” in Grant, Rebecca, and Kathleen Newland, eds.

goal, much like Tickner's, is to recognize the diversity of feminist ideology and to collect its conceptual strengths and commonalities in order to form criterion for policy analysis.

In this process, I have come to the conclusion that there are four major areas of analysis that ought to be included in a feminist evaluation of international policy. Such a feminist evaluation would include, but not necessarily be limited to, a comprehensive rather than privileged account of international affairs, a critical redefinition the treatment of power in the international arena, a prioritization of the goal of genuine peace, and an awareness of womyn's rights concerns.

Adopting a Comprehensive View of International Political Factors

The first principle of the proposed feminist viewpoint concerning international relations is a comprehensive, rather than privileged, view of the factors to be taken into account when making international relations policy. The policy-making lens utilized by current decision-makers fails to utilize the peripheral vision necessary to see many of the world's important political complexities. Rebecca Grant describes the picture that international relations theorists have concerning the international situation as incomplete. She explains that the world that the international relations theory community deals with is "a fragmentary and distorted version of the world."³ This fragmentation stems from international preoccupation with issues of security and trade. The issues of security and trade are areas where values traditionally associated with masculinity pervade.⁴

J. Ann Tickner supports Grant's interpretation of the scope of international relations theories' evaluations as she calls the discipline "based on assumptions about human nature that

Gender and International Relations Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991, 35.

³Grant, Rebecca, and Kathleen Newland, eds. Gender and International Relations Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991, 1.

⁴ For the purposes of this evaluation, the separation of values as 'masculine' or 'feminine' does not connote that they are values inherent to men or womyn, but only that they have been associated therewith. Likewise, the 'feminist' values are not necessarily those inherent to womyn, but instead values that have developed as a part of the observance and practice of the experience of womynhood.

privilege the masculine.”⁵ She relates international relations to masculinity as she recognizes the prevalent utilization of force in the international arena. Tickner’s idea of masculinity is not necessarily tied to the state of being a man. She discusses a concept of masculinity, where masculinity is another word for dominance, called masculine in opposition to femininity, which has been symbolic of weakness and subordination at many points in history. By masculine values, I mean that these are the values that are acted upon by the power establishment in the world of politics and political theory. The combination of the dominative connotation of the term ‘masculine’ and the fact that most politicians and many political theories do come to the table with the experience, vocabulary, and ideas of *male-ness*, insofar as social construction and social norms in this world differentiate the experience of *male-ness* and *womynhood*.

Tickner goes on to present more evidence for the thesis of the masculinity of international relations practice by pointing out that the ways in which nations relate is often “described in the appropriate locker-room or football language.”⁶ This language includes ‘invading’ other nations, ‘raping’ natural resources, ‘dominating’ our enemies, ‘feminizing’ other cultures, heroism discourse, and ‘forcing’ behavioral choices. In the international community, words like ‘coercion’ and ‘leverage’ are thrown around more frequently than peace words, and normally have at least the threat of bite behind their bark. Grant and Newland describe the discourse and action of international relations as “narrow,” justifying their argument by recognizing that “excluded from that conception, quite comprehensively, is the experience of most women(*sic*).”⁷

The argument that *wymyn*’s experience is excluded from international relations dialogue is not the same as the argument that all men’s opinions and experiences are enfranchised. Instead, feminist international relations theory recognizes that it is not just the power inequality of gender, but the existence of power inequality, that creates subordination. Considering classism, racism,

⁵ J. Ann Tickner “Hans Morgenthau’s Principles of political realism: a reformulation” in Grant, Rebecca, and Kathleen Newland, eds. *Gender and International Relations* Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991, 33.

⁶ J. Ann Tickner. *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* NY: Columbia University Press, 1992, 42.

⁷ Grant, Rebecca, and Kathleen Newland, eds. *Gender and International Relations* Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana

and sexism as a combination of subordinations of the 'rest of society' by the 'elite,' Jill Steans describes the world of international policy-making as a "partial reality filtered through the standpoints of some men."⁸ Here she recognizes that international relations is privileging of the masculine, but qualifies that all men aren't the ultimate beneficiaries of this male privilege. She also recognizes that there exists a white privilege, and a class privilege that influence male dominance to make it the dominance of 'some men' rather than of 'all men.' The elitism of the discourse of international relations makes J. Ann Tickner's claim that "it is a discourse so far removed from politics and people" a logical conclusion.⁹

Postmodernist feminist scholarship has begun to construct a positive framework to address these difficulties through the rejection of totalizing discourses. Robert Keohane explains that "its [postmodern feminism's] essence appears to be a resistance to the concept of one true story and to a 'falsely universalizing perspective' such as that of white men."¹⁰ Esteva and Prakash outline their project as "abandoning projects to help or develop peoples at the grassroots, we invite others to learn from them the knowledge and skills required to survive and flourish beyond modernity."¹¹ While I will leave the issue of the relationship between postmodernism and feminism to a different composition, I believe that an ethic against patronization of the "womyn," -Western," guides a perspective concerning international relations informed by feminist theory.

Current international relations theory has a limited scope, feminist international relations pays attention to that subject matter that tradition has limited out of the spectrum. The traditional framework, feminist authors argue, is not a set of ideas for feminists to work under and alter its effects, but one to be completely reworked due to its inadequacy. V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan argue that the feminist quest to reform international relations theory and praxis is

University Press, 1991,1.

⁸ Sylvester, Christine. *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of IR Theory* 1992, 170-1.

⁹ J. Ann Tickner. *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* NY: Columbia University Press, 1992, 45.

¹⁰ Robert O. Keohane "International Relations theory: contributions of a feminist standpoint" in Grant, Rebecca, and Kathleen Newland, eds. *Gender and International Relations* Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991, 41-2.

¹¹ Esteva, Gustavo, and Madhu Suri Prakash. *Grassroots Postmodernism: The Soil of Culture* Penn State, 1998, 6.

“not about vanquishing and transcending according to the rules of the game, but about changing the game.”¹² Changing the game, from a feminist standpoint, would entail a critical redefinition that broadened the scope of criterion for policy evaluation in international relations. While the experiences of *some men* are the current basis for the formulation of international relations policy, the experience of *all people* would be involved in making decisions, regardless of race, class, gender, or sexuality.

Redefinition of Power

A feminist epistemology of international relations would also undertake the task of reinterpreting the concept of power between nations. Feminist scholarship of gender relations has made progress in the area of redefining power between the genders, and feminist scholarship of international relations would take the same viewpoint towards power between nations. The current conception of power is that of ‘power-over;’ power is used for the purposes of manipulating the less powerful into compliance with the desires and/or interests of the more powerful. The United States having ‘the power to prevent the government of Serbia from invading Kosovo’ means that the United States will be able to pressure, persuade, leverage, or force the government of Serbia in order to get that government to comply with its demands.

Power is thus a conflict-based concept, in that power is what an individual or state actor will use in order to either prevent a conflict or be victorious in a conflict. This view of power then prioritizes victory over compromise, and conquering over agreeing. This interpretation of power also necessitates that the power-seeker to choose her individual or state interests over the protection of others. In this way, power-over creates a self-other dichotomy that devalues the ‘other.’

The alternative to a conception of power that emphasizes dominance is a conception of power that emphasizes concert. Seeing power as the ability to act in concert privileges agreement,

¹² Runyan, Anne Sisson and V. Spike Peterson. “The Radical Future of Realism: Feminist Subversions of IR Theory.” *Alternative* Vol16 Num 1 p77.

coalition-building, and egalitarian negotiation. Tickner explains “thinking about power in this multidimensional sense may help us to think constructively about the potential for cooperation as well as conflict, an aspect of international relations generally played down by realism.”¹³ If Tickner is right that the status quo downplays the concept of cooperation, then the political world could progress more towards ‘peace’ simply by inserting cooperation into the mix of political possibilities.

Robert Keohane sees that the feminist reinterpretation of power presented here makes sense out of the existence of power in an interdependent world. The conception of power-over may be suitable in a world where nation-states of certain constructed borders could and did exist independently of one another. However, if the world is truly becoming interdependent, all citizens of the world share collective problems. While those problems, such as environmental decline, overpopulation, starvations, and malnutrition, currently affect parts more strongly than they affect other parts of the world, they are global issues in the sense that they will affect the entirety of the human community. Considering those relationships, it is the maximization of collective efforts for the collective good that empowers people and nations through the improvement of the quality of life. In this light, “emphasizing power as the ability to act in concert would call attention to areas of world politics in which human beings seek to collaborate to cope with collective problems, such as those arising from ecological and economic interdependence.”¹⁴

This view of peace could be interpreted as networking, that is, creating links between people for the purpose of the benefit of all. This networking could reach from the individual level to the level of ‘enlightened’ institutions – that is, institutions that operate under the assumption of these entities of a feminist framework of international relations. This network view would engage in “emphasizing how institutions could promote lateral cooperation among organized entities.”¹⁵

¹³ J. Ann Tickner “Hans Morgenthau’s Principles of political realism: a reformulation” in Grant, Rebecca, and Kathleen Newland, eds. *Gender and International Relations* Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991, 33.

¹⁴ Robert O. Keohane “International Relations theory: contributions of a feminist standpoint” in Grant, Rebecca, and Kathleen Newland, eds. *Gender and International Relations* Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991, 44-5.

¹⁵ Robert O. Keohane “International Relations theory: contributions of a feminist standpoint” in Grant, Rebecca, and Kathleen

In this way, international relations theory could go beyond questions of who is able to control whom, and how, to reach a level of interaction where human beings could cooperate to find working, long-term, peaceable solutions to the issues that are currently called ‘conflicts’ among state, international, and non-state actors. In contrast to the status quo, Keohane makes the distinction that “a feminist-institutionalist theory asks under what conditions are human beings able to act in concert, across state boundaries, to create networks that achieve common purposes.”¹⁶ Asking these questions would bring about collective discourse for the purpose of achieving common ends. The direction of this discourse towards common ends rather than towards state interest would cause the abandonment of abuse of one nation by another for competitive gain.

This redefinition of power necessarily attacks the hierarchy involved in elitism. Elitism is by definition the unequal relationship between the dominant and the subordinate, in which the dominant makes the rules that the subordinate follows. Betty Reardon supposes that the order of the elite is generally competitive in two ways. In the obvious way, the elite are competitive with each other for relative prestige, that is, the elite are looking to be recognized as ‘more elite’ than their competitor elite. She recognizes that “although their relationship is competitive within elite structures, there is a common objective that holds elites together: the maintenance of their own control and dominance.”¹⁷ Armed with this recognition, Reardon examines elites’ second sphere of competition, that is, with the non-elites. Their competition with the non-elites is exemplified in the elites’ attempts to dictate non-elites’ actions. The international system is full of elites (the United States) competing with non-elites (Iraq) for the control of the actions of the non-elite state (weapons building and war reparations). As Reardon classifies elites, “their primary competition is therefore with the non-elites, the majority of the world’s people. Control is maintained by

Newland, eds. *Gender and International Relations* Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991, 44-5.

¹⁶Robert O. Keohane “International Relations theory: contributions of a feminist standpoint” in Grant, Rebecca, and Kathleen Newland, eds. *Gender and International Relations* Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991, 44-5.

¹⁷ Reardon, Betty A. *Sexism and the War System* NY and London: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1985, 10-11.

threat, intimidation, and, when necessary, violent coercion.”¹⁸ Power is, then, the leverage of states over people, and the leverage of ‘powerful states’ over less powerful states.

The feminist recalculation of power also influences the way that international policymakers would think about the issue of interethnic relations. Jill Steans informs us “the orthodoxy within international relations continues to privilege the ‘nation-state’ as the primary locus of collective identity.”¹⁹ The nation-state focus brings about a prioritization of the concept of ‘national interest,’ which puts a priority on the ‘interests’ of the people within constructed national borders over those outside of those borders. This dichotomization is evident when you ask a United States citizen whether they would prefer that an American or an Iraqi lose their lives. Most Americans show their national loyalty by choosing that the Iraqi die. The nation-state focus otherizes people that are ‘outside the borders’ of one’s own nation. A feminist viewpoint assigns equal value to all lives, whether they are within national borders or not. As Keohane hopes, “a feminist standpoint might help distinguish between the notions of sovereignty based on power as control and those based on power-as-action-in-concert, and to reinvigorate the latter conception, which has been recently obscured by statist and realist thought.”²⁰

A feminist revision of the ideas of power in international policy-making prompts reexamination of the utilization of these concepts of statism, national interest, threats, and violence in international relations. This reexamination causes a translation of the ideas of power from the world of coercion to the world of cooperation, and feminist power-with is a means to deal with international differences to promote equality and peace.

Prioritization of the Goals of Genuine Peace

The third principle involved in this feminist epistemology of international relations policy is the prioritization of peace. As opposed to the traditional viewpoint of international relations,

¹⁸ Reardon, Betty A. *Sexism and the War System* NY and London: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1985, 10-11.

¹⁹ Steans, Jill. *Gender in International Relations* 1998 p.62.

²⁰ Robert O. Keohane “International Relations theory: contributions of a feminist standpoint” in Grant, Rebecca, and Kathleen

which privileges interest, conflict, and violence, feminist conceptualizations would see peace as the goal of interactions between states. Carol Cohn identifies the state as a gendered entity as she observes that the state “bears an uncanny resemblance to a familiar image of masculine identity.”²¹ The state often focuses on its own power and competitive ability in the international world, and is willing to trample both its opponents and neutral parties to accomplish its goals. If patriarchy is defined by the conflict between men (the powerful) to control womyn (the powerless), the system of patriarchy is entrenched in the relations between nations. The dominant nations fight other dominant nations, using the subordinate nations as pawns to win the chess game. The Cold War demonstrated this point, where the ‘men’ (the United States and the Soviet Union) fought each other over control of and using the ‘womyn’ (Latin America, Korea, Vietnam, and later Africa). Betty Reardon recognizes that “peace and patriarchy are antithetical.”²² Her argument is that the existence of peace requires equality, and patriarchy entrenches and strengthens inequality. In this way, both gender equality and power equality among nations are necessary prerequisites to peaceful behavior. Bernice Carroll and Barbara Hall expand on and explain this argument, “from this standpoint, war and all systematic violence (including rape, domestic violence, and other forms of violence usually seen as “private”) are inherent in patriarchy as a social system. The implication is that war cannot be eliminated without eliminating patriarchy, and that there can be no true or lasting “peace” or “security” until the underlying patriarchal social structures and gender relations are transformed.”²³

The social system of patriarchy is based on a series of dominant/subordinate relationships, which entrench government by force rather than government by consent, in the home, in the workplace, in national government, and in international relations. R. W. Connell takes this theoretical critique to a policy level as he claims that “modern states kill on a horrific

Newland, eds. *Gender and International Relations* Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991, 43.

²¹ Carol Cohn in Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King, eds. *Rocking the Ship of the State: Towards a Feminist Peace Politics* Boulder, San Francisco, and London: Westview Press, 1989, 160.

²² Betty A Reardon. *Sexism and the War System* NY and London: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1985, 37.

level.”²⁴ Connell’s argument is based on the existence of institutionalized masculine toughness that causes both physical and structural violence.²⁵ J. Ann Tickner makes the affirmative point that feminist international theory is not about the mere avoidance of violence but about the establishment of a system of peace. She argues that “the achievement of peace, economic justice, and ecological sustainability is inseparable from overcoming social relations of domination and subordination.”²⁶ From this conception, feminist international relations theory constructs a different interpretation of peace, based on the principles of equality and cooperation, rather than just a lack of violence in the traditional sense. Karen Warren and Duane Cody inform us, “genuine peace (“positive peace, other hand, involves interaction between and among individuals and groups where such behavior is orderly from within, cooperative, and based on agreement. Genuine peace is not the mere absence of war (“negative peace”), where order is imposed from outside by domination (Cady 1989, 1991). It is the process and reality where life-affirming, self-determined, environmentally sustainable ends are sought and accomplished through coalitionary, interactive, cooperative means.”²⁷ The distinction between positive and negative peace is an area of progress where feminist international relations viewpoints transcend traditional viewpoints. When we believe that peace is the mere absence of firing missiles, then we allow that ‘peace’ to be brought about by any means possible: sanctions, coercion, and the threat of violence.

Wymyn’s Rights

A feminist viewpoint concerning international relations would give attention to wymyn’s rights, interpreted as a womyn’s right to exist in society as an equal to a man. While I desire to

²³ Bernice Carroll and Barbara Welling Hall, “Feminist perspectives on Women and the Use of Force Women and the Use of Military Force 1993, 16.

²⁴ RW Connell, “The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics,” in *Theory and Security* Vol 19 No 5 1990, 530.

²⁵ Pamela Johnston Conover and Virginia Sapiro, in “Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War” *American Journal of Political Science* v37, n4, Nov, 1999, 1079-1099, report the results of a study of reactions to war generally and the Gulf War specifically. While wymyn were neither significantly more or less opposed to violence than men were, persons who declared themselves of feminist persuasion consistently found the aggression to be unjustified, and war an unacceptable way of solving problems. This sets up a dichotomy between the feminist viewpoint, opposing war, and a ‘masculinist’ viewpoint, accepting and encouraging war. Neither is intrinsically related to gender, instead, related to certain constructions and experiences of gender in the world. In this way, we can classify institutionalized toughness and bullying as in opposition to feminist ideas, or, masculine.

²⁶ J. Ann Tickner. *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* NY: Columbia University Press, 1992.

resist falling into “the all too easy pattern of conflating what we know about *Woman (sic)*(the universal ideal or subject) with particular *women (sic)*,” equality of agency is a central tenet to the principles of feminism.²⁸ Without assuming particular things about particular wymyn, feminist international relations theory can reject discrimination against wymyn based on their sex or gender as illegitimate. The feminist movement’s foundations are in the demand for wymyn’s rights. While these demands have been sensitized by cultural variation and critiques of the essentialism of grouping wymyn together, they have remained largely intact.

The feminist international relations viewpoint would demand that wymyn be treated as men’s equals in society. This view of equality, however, is not the conservative view of equal opportunity. Some argue that wymyn and minorities currently enjoy equal opportunity in the United States because there are no longer jobs or institutions legally closed to their entrance. Discrimination, however, is not that simple. While there are not jobs or institutions closed to wymyn in the United States, wymyn routinely are paid less and given less prestigious jobs than their equally qualified male counterparts. Add those oppressions to the volumes of sexual harassment in the workplace, and we find that wymyn do not really have equal opportunities to succeed. Catherine McKinnon once told me that, even though the law recognizes wymyn’s equality, it is a formal rather than substantive equality recognition. A recognition of substantive equality would combat the inequalities that exist in the world.

Armed with a vision of substantive equality, a feminist epistemology of international relations would advocate that wymyn’s rights be taken into consideration in societies, and that wymyn, as men’s equals, be participants in government equal to men. Another common misinterpretation of the call for wymyn’s equality is the idea that it rejects ‘special privileges’ for wymyn such as prenatal care, maternity leave, and other such needs specific to being a woyyn. An equal rights claim is not a pure equal treatment claim in this situation, however. Those who

²⁷ Karen J. Warren and Duane L. Cody, “Feminism and Peace: Seeing Connections” *Hypatia* Spring 1994 v9 n2 p6

²⁸ Nancy Isenberg, “The Personal is Political: Gender, Feminism, and the Politics of

are not equally situated demand unequal treatment. We treat a heart attack differently than a stroke, likewise we treat a pregnancy differently than testicular cancer. Specific health needs of all individuals are included in their rights of equality. A womyn's rights claim is a clam to womyn's equal influence in political decision-making, equal social stature, and equal protection under the laws.

How far the advocacy of womyn's rights goes is an issue that presents feminist international relations theory with quite a quandary. If feminist international relations theory advocates that womyn's rights be pursued at all opportunities, for example, in a situation where military force is required to protect a womyn's right to free speech, then the principles of its theory conflict. At the same time, if feminist international relations theory advocates no international intervention on behalf of the rights of womyn, it also seems to be betraying its own cause. Balancing equalities is a difficult business. Does one prioritize national, racial, or gender equality in a situation in which these values apparently conflict?

The answer is that apparent conflict does not mean that the ideas are irreconcilable. Feminist international relations theory can advocate its ideas about the social relations between men and womyn, and between a society and its member womyn, without dictating that policy, and without treating other nations as inferiors for lack of compliance with those ideas. This way, feminist theory can accommodate the needs and choices of womyn all over the world. Also, feminist theory could practice the equality it preaches by soliciting the participation of womyn around the world to contribute to its formulations of the concepts of womyn's rights. While the idea of 'permitting' feminists within the Greater Horn of Africa 'not to condemn enfibulation, or female genital surgery is downright disgusting to most of us feminists in the Western Hemisphere/developed world, that would be the policy that a feminist epistemology of international relations might prescribe. 'We' cannot, and should not if 'we' could, control the choices of womyn in different societies and cultures. 'We' can, however, speak about the

advantages of free and equal treatment, and the health risks of such procedures. 'We' can provide literature and information about the problems with sexual subordination, and the advantages of making your own sexual choices. 'We' can strongly condemn instances where such decisions are not left to wymyn's choice, or where the choice forced without sufficient information. We cannot, and ought not, prohibit or judge decisions made by individuals in Kenya.²⁹ To do so would be to entrench the very inequalities that feminist international relations theory is purposed to destroy.

In conclusion, a feminist international relations viewpoint concerning wymyn's rights would advocate wymyn's equal social and political status at every opportunity. It would prescribe policies that unconditionally called for such equality, where wymyn's needs would be attended to, and their voices heard. A feminist epistemology would also respect national and cultural differences of opinion, and operate on the premise of coordination and cooperation, as opposed to judgment and control.

²⁹ This problem was posed to me on the Debate circuit this year, by a team from Ball State University, reading evidence written by Kenyan feminist condemning 'Western' feminists' interventionist tendencies. The line between espousing what we see as 'masculinism' and what we see as 'imperialism' is difficult. Sadly, in an equal world, we will all have to deal with others' choices that make us very disappointed. It is imperialist to choose for someone in Kenya whether or not they can undergo this surgery; imperialist if the choice is made by the United States, masculinist if the choice is made by the Kenyan government or civic leadership. I remain personally convinced that, given the honest choice, most wymyn in Kenya would not make the decision to undergo the procedure, but that some wymyn would. Though I disagree, and this is one of the hardest issues I have dealt with on my road to

CHAPTER 2. POLITICAL AND ACADEMIC ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF SANCTIONS

The status quo policy of the United States weighs in heavily in favor of economic sanctions. The Bush administration advocated sanctions as a policy of international solidarity against violators of international law. The Clinton Administration instituted more economic sanctions than any administration in United States history, and the new Bush administration follows in its predecessors' footsteps. Colin Powell, as Secretary of State, has promised to make sanctions on Iraq less harsh.³⁰ Powell's promise, while it is a surprising change in attitude, does not substantially alter the United States' generally pro-sanctions policy for a couple of reasons. First, Powell has not made any attempts to change the United States' sanctions regimes on any of the other nations on which we impose either partial sanctions or full economic embargoes. Powell has been known to advocate a strategy to work with U.S. allies to "energize the sanctions regime" against Iraq.³¹ Second, his decision to ease sanctions on Iraq is one that is against the

feminist understanding, I respect the decision as a personal one.

³⁰ About.com, "UPDATE: Powell Signals Shift on US Sanctions Policy," 03/02/2001, accessed 03/06/2001 at <http://arabculture.about.com/culture/arabculture/library/weekly/aa022701d.htm>.

³¹ Joel Bleifus. "Nobody's Hero." InTheseTimes.Com Independent News and Views, 22 January 2001, accessed 6 March 2001 at

United States' general policy. Powell by all accounts has an uphill battle to fight to get the United States to act at all on his promises. Finally, even Powell's promises are not that progressive against sanctions, as he maintains that the economic embargo should only be interrupted for transfer of foodstuffs, and that even those transfers should be monitored internationally and constantly. In fact, the United States remains firmly committed to policies of economic sanctions as a major way to obtain behavioral leverage in the international community.

The United States' policy determination to keep sanctions in its arsenal of policy choices brings up the question: why? How does the government that imposes most of the world's sanctions justify the policy? Aside from the justification, why do they implement sanctions?

The question of how sanctions are justified can be best answered by looking for statements of sanctions' proponents in government. The United States justifies and campaigns for sanctions based on the security threats to the United States and its allies, governments' disregard for international standards, and governments' human rights records.

Most of the rhetoric concerning economic sanctions coming from the United States government emphasizes the potential security threat of the sanctioned nations. Fidel Castro is willing to house 'our' enemies a short distance from 'our shore.' The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has missiles that will reach Japan, and (gasp) might get 'The Bomb.' The threat coming from the nations that are sanctioned is categorized in two different ways. The threats come stem a combination of the dictator and the weapons capacity of these nations. Donna Kaplowitz documents that one of the primary reasons for United States sanctions on Cuba is to encourage the overthrow of Fidel Castro.³² The Air Force's counterproliferation experts speculate, "Iraq will likely be a potential threat as long as it is governed by Saddam Hussein."³³ The specific threat coming from these sanctioned nations is interpreted in the form of weapons of

<http://www.inthesetimes.com/web2504/edit2504.html>.

³² Donna Rich Kaplowitz, *The Anatomy of a Failed Embargo: U. S. Sanctions Against Cuba* Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

mass destruction. A writer for the Washington Times jumps on the government bandwagon and asserts, “Iran and Iraq may join North Korea in presenting a ballistic missile threat to the mainland United States within the next ten years.”³⁴ A ballistic missile threat is, presumably, bad and dangerous. Never mind that the United States ‘presents a ballistic missile threat’ to every citizen of every nation of the world, if ‘ballistic missile threat’ means the capability to hit the -Continental Ballistic Missile. Still, the security threat posed to the United States is one of the major arguments used to support the use of sanctions. In the words of the State Department, discussing sanctions on ‘rogue nations,’ “we are committed to containing the threat that the regime poses.”³⁵

More often than they use the rhetoric of security threat to the United States to support sanctions, United States policymakers frame nations under U. S. sanctions as security threats to their regions. Referencing the Gulf War and the Iran-Iraq war, Thomas Pickering depicts Iraq as a state of international threats and violence. He argues, “Saddam has repeatedly used force against his neighbors, developed weapons of mass destruction and used those weapons on citizens and neighbors.”³⁶ Syria is under sanctions as a security threat for its potential aggression against Israel.³⁷ The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a potential threat to Japan. Iraq is described as a regional security threat in many different scenarios.

Anthony Cordesman lists many potential regional war scenarios that could result from an unrestrained Iraq. They include a “confrontation with Israel”³⁸, a “strike at Jordan”, and “clashes with Turkey or Iran³⁸ over Iraqi efforts to attack the Kurds.”³⁹ These wouldn’t be small

³³ Barry R. Schneider, Director of the USAF counterproliferation center at Air University; Associate Professor of International Relations at US War College, *Future War and Counter-Proliferation*, 1999, 6.

³⁴ Walter Pincus. “Iran, Iraq Could Join Missile Threat to U. S.” *Washington Post* 10 September 1999, p.A03.

³⁵ Thomas Pickering, Undersecretary of Political Affairs, Remarks to the Trilateral Commission; 3/15/99 accessed 8/15/99 at www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990315_pickering.html.

³⁶ Thomas Pickering, Undersecretary of Political Affairs, Remarks to the Trilateral Commission; 3/15/99 accessed 8/15/99 at www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990315_pickering.html.

³⁷ Knowing that Syria is considered a security threat to Israel, it is with interest that I note that Israel bombed Syria this week, and Syria did not retaliate (*Chicago Tribune* 4/15/2001).

³⁸ Syria and Iran are also sanctioned in part for this reason.

³⁹ Anthony Cordesman, Senior Fellow, CSIS Iraq after Saddam – Nation Building and Opposition Movements 11/98, p. 46.

confrontations, the United States' government argues. Instead, they have the potential to be explosive conflicts. Cordesman speculates that Iraq will engage in activities to upgrade its weapons capabilities in order to threaten its neighbors. He foresees Iraq's "creation of biological strike capability, purchase nuclear weapon(s) to intimidate region."⁴⁰ The United States does not just argue that sanctions are necessary to protect the region from Iraq, but that sanctions are necessary to protect the region from Iraq *because* the region being safe is in United States' interests. Pickering argues that the United States must guard against Iraq's serious "potential to destabilize regions of great importance to U. S. interests."⁴¹ Thus, sanctions protect both regional stability and United States' interest, according to their proponents and institutors.

In addition to the concern about normative military threats, the United States uses sanctions because of a problem with threats coming from state-sponsored international terrorism.

The United States has sanctions on Libya because of Libya's refusal to extradite the alleged Lockerbie bombers. The United States maintains a list of nations that it believes engage in state sponsored terrorism. Among those nations are five nations that are major targets of United States sanctions, Iran, Syria, The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Cuba, and Iraq. The Counterterrorism Branch of the State Department claims that, in the 1990s, "Iraq continued to engage in state-sponsored internal and international terrorism."⁴² Cordesman fears that Iraq will engage in the sort of international terrorism it did immediately preceding the Gulf War, that is, nation-nabbing for ransom. He predicts that lifting of sanctions on Iraq might cause a "sudden invasion of Kuwait: Attempt to create 'hostage state/people.'"⁴³ In addition to the use of normative military force for the purposes of terrorism, Cordesman fears that Iraq could resort to

⁴⁰ Anthony Cordesman, Senior Fellow, CSIS Iraq after Saddam – Nation Building and Opposition Movements 11/98, p. 46.

⁴¹ Thomas Pickering, Undersecretary of Political Affairs, Remarks to the Trilateral Commission; 3/15/99 accessed 8/15/99 at www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990315_pickering.html.

⁴² Thomas Pickering, Undersecretary of Political Affairs, Remarks to the Trilateral Commission; 3/15/99 accessed 8/15/99 at www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990315_pickering.html.

⁴³ Anthony Cordesman, Senior Fellow, CSIS Iraq after Saddam – Nation Building and Opposition Movements 11/98, p. 46.

“use of chemical or biological terrorism.”⁴⁴

Another justification for the use of economic sanctions is to promote compliance with international norms and legal standards. Most of the nations that have become subject to sanctions in modern history have been in violation of some internationally held principle. Italy in the early 1930s violated international standards for aggression, South Africa in the 1980s violated international standards against blatant segregation, The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea refuses to lose the Cold War, and Iraq refuses to allow the United Nations to fulfill its desire to inspect Iraqi military establishments for weapons. There is much political haggling internationally over the sanctions towards Iraq, which are officially United Nations sanctions, though most of the Security Council and the General Assembly favor lifting them.⁴⁵ The conflict among Security Council members revolves around what it would mean to allow Iraq to escape from the sanctions regime even though they remain out of compliance with the United Nations’ order to allow weapons inspections within Iraq’s borders. The precedent that would be set by letting a violator of international norms get away with the violation is considered dangerous by the leading sanctions advocate, the United States. This is one of the leading reasons for the enforcement of sanctions.

The lack of compliance with international norms creates other problems that support the policy of sanctions, as sanctions advocates see it. Many of the nations that are under sanctions regimes have caused the international community significant trouble in the past. Nations under United States sanctions participated in the Korean War, conflicts in the Middle East, the Gulf War, protecting the Lockerbie bombers, and other assorted sponsorship of international terrorism. Their defiance of international norms reminds the international community of more dangerous times. For example, Iraq’s lack of compliance with international demands creates the perception

⁴⁴ Anthony Cordesman, Senior Fellow, CSIS Iraq after Saddam – Nation Building and Opposition Movements 11/98, p. 46.

⁴⁵ These sanctions, however, cannot be lifted, as a United States vote of “veto” would keep the sanctions in place. The United States has made it clear that such a veto would be used, and the issue has therefore not come up in the Security Council. This unilateral

that the nation is as defiant now as it was in the early nineties, and a smoking gun of aggression that will shoot when released from the pressure of sanctions. Anthony Cordesman, a government advisor and employee of CSIS, argues that “So long as Iraq remains out of compliance we will work with the International Community to maintain and enforce economic sanctions. Sanctions have cost Saddam more than \$120 billion. Resources that would have been used to rebuild his military.”⁴⁶ This argument combines the security threat rhetoric with a value of the importance of the will of the international community to maintain order. Cordesman’s viewpoint interprets the world as a place of anarchy, where enforcement international consensus keeps it a ‘peaceful’

Criticism of the sanctioned governments’ domestic policies has also been used as a justification for sanctions. Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq has been long reputed for its disregard for international interpretations of human rights, and for its abuse of its people. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s observations say this reputation is still true, there is no improvement in the government’s extremely poor human rights.⁴⁷ Human rights problems in Iraq are serious and varied. The largest, however, has to do with the treatment of Saddam Hussein’s political opponents. Observers state that, despite encouragement to stop the practice, “the government continued to execute summarily perceived opposition.”⁴⁸ Racial minorities seem to share a fate with political minorities in Iraq, as the Kurds in the north are consistently oppressed. Human Rights Watch reported that “the government’s ‘Arabization policy in the oil-rich province of Krikuk continues as 1468 Kurdish families were expelled to the Kurdish-controlled region in the north between 15 April and June. A number of relatives of targeted families were apparently detained in preparation for the expulsion and the food rationing tickets as well as properties of target families were reportedly confiscated by Iraqi authorities.”⁴⁹

bullying makes sanctions on Iraq effectively a U. S. policy.

⁴⁶ Anthony Cordesman, Co-director, CSIS Middle East Studies Program. Iraq in Crisis: A History from Desert Fox to June 1999 1 July 1999, 15.

⁴⁷ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U. S. Department of State Iraq Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998 26 Feb. 1999 accessed 8/15/99 at www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/iraq.html.

⁴⁸ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U. S. Department of State Iraq Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998 26 Feb. 1999 accessed 8/15/99 at www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/iraq.html.

⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch, World Report 1999: Iraq 1999, accessed 9/11/99 at <http://humanrights.org>.

This Arabization policy has been going on for years, to the dismay of the Kurds who occupy large landmasses within the state of Iraq. The United Nations has created a no-fly zone above Kurdish lands, preventing the government from maintaining a campaign of military bombing of the Kurds. Still, they are oppressed. Supporters of sanctions argue that lifting the embargo might give Iraq the go-ahead to start a “war with the Kurds in the Kurdish territory.”⁵⁰ The Kurds’ military strength is inferior to that of the Iraqi government, and any war between the groups would just be another bloody repression. Sanctions, supporters argue, save the Kurds from demise. Finally, the government of Iraq targets sexual minorities. Human Rights Watch claims that, in Iraq, “the government killed many women and children, including infants, by firing squads and its chemical attacks.”⁵¹

The Iraqi government is not the only government under sanctions at least in part because of domestic policy. The sanctions on Cuba are in part to encourage democratization. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea allegedly diverts food aid to its citizens. The sanctions on South Africa were entirely because of the internal policy of Apartheid, or racial separation. The sanctions on Serbia protest how Serbia treats the people in Kosovo, which is a part of Serbia. Sanctions have been used many times for the purpose of making statements about and encouraging change of domestic human rights policy.

Sanctions are justified rhetorically by the threats to security, international norms, and domestic populations that of sanctioned governments. The governments that are sanctioned engage in behavior that the United States and other pro-sanctions agents find to be unacceptable. They are thus punished. Pro-sanctions agents, however, have an uphill battle to win any argument that the punishment has any affect on the objectionable policies of the punished nation. Sanctions were adopted with the premise, stated by Thomas Pickering, that “the silent fact of our unity and

Miningco.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport99/mideast/iraq.html.

⁵⁰ Anthony Cordesman, Senior Fellow, CSIS Iraq after Saddam – Nation Building and Opposition Movements 11/98, p. 46.

⁵¹ Human Rights Watch, World Report 1999: Iraq 1999, accessed 9/11/99 at <http://humanrights>.

Miningco.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport99/mideast/iraq.html.

power has proven to be an insufficient deterrent.”⁵² Words without weapons did not convince sanctioned nations to comply with those standards that the United States found to be acceptable, so the United States found a weapon that might work, sanctions, and has been deploying it on a regular basis; in Cuba, for forty years; in Iraq, for a decade; elsewhere, for just as long.

CHAPTER 3. POLITICAL AND ACADEMIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST SANCTIONS

Those in the political and academic community who support sanctions see their policy as an agent of discipline that maintains order in an anarchical world. Some people who argue against sanctions believe that anarchy is exaggerated, and do not see sanctions as an effective tool of curbing behavior. Many more opponents of sanctions oppose the policy on humanitarian grounds. The major arguments made against sanctions are that sanctioned nations are not a viable security threat, that sanctions are overused, that sanctions do not achieve their goals, and that they bring about a humanitarian disaster to civilian populations.

Sanctions’ opponents argue that Iraq, specifically, and the nations that the United States sanctions, generally, do not pose a security threat to the United States or the rest of the world. While the last three decades have not been marked by international peace for Iraq, some argue that its aggressions have been the result of misunderstandings or provocation. The Iran-Iraq war was a conflict where the United States’ allegiances varied, and many times, Iraq came out to be

⁵² Thomas Pickering, Undersecretary of Political Affairs, Remarks to the Trilateral Commission; 3/15/99 accessed 8/15/99 at www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990315_pickering.html.

our favorite. The invasion of Kuwait, some claim, was cleared ahead of time by major allies. The crux of the argumentation that Iraq is not a threat does not come from excusing the past, however, it comes from the observations of the status quo. Stephen Zunes challenges the United States and its allies have “never publicly presented any credible evidence that Iraq currently has biological weapons.”⁵³ The United States certainly has not presented proof that anyone has seen a biological, chemical, or nuclear weapon in Iraq since the Gulf War. Absent this evidence, authors argue, there is no justification for starving the Iraqi people on the chance that Iraq just might be aggressive someday.

Likewise, the last act of war committed by The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was in the 1950s. While there is evidence that some sort of low-grade weapons program exists in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, there is also evidence that it exists as leverage for food aid. There is no empirical or direct evidence that The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will use those weapons. In Iran, there is ample evidence of government liberalization, and, with it, a corresponding decrease in the security threat Iran might cause to its neighbors. There has been no hard evidence that Syria has engaged in state-sponsored terrorism since 1979. Still, the implementers of sanctions policy have not taken this decrease of threat into account and decreased sanctions. Instead, sanctions’ opponents argue, sanctions remain on these nations though the nations’ security threats are almost entirely fabricated.

Another argument against sanctions is that they are overused as a policy option. The argument holds that sanctions were effective when they were only used in specific instances to achieve direct policy objectives. While sanctions were used in the 1980’s only twice, against South Africa and Rhodesia, their use proliferated in the 1990’s. Daniel Drezner records, “the United States has threatened or implemented economic coercion against more than forty countries

⁵³ Stephen Zunes, Assistant Professor of Politics and Chair of the Peace and Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco, “Confrontation with Iraq: A Bankrupt U. S. Policy.” *Middle East Policy*, Vol 6, no. 1, June 1998.

since 1990.”⁵⁴ This overuse, opponents argue, has decreased the likelihood of international support for sanctions regimes. A lack of international support makes it more likely that sanctions will be subverted by other nations interested in trading with the sanctioned nation. Also, sanctions’ overuse makes the sanctioned nation take the threat less seriously. Currently, there are forty nations that the United States feels to be outside of the international norms in a way significant enough to impose economic punishment. The broadness of sanctions creates solidarity against them, between sanctioned nations and nations opposed to the embargoes. This project will not cover the ethics or effectiveness of sanctions before this expansion of sanctions, except insofar as they relate to the current sanctions regimes. For the purpose of analysis of the policy choice of sanctions in the status quo, this project will examine sanctions as they are, with both the implications of current sanctions regimes and inherent to sanctions regimes, but not as they were, or as they might have been. This sight into the past is interesting to historical theory, but not directly relevant to the determination of the appropriateness of current sanctions policies.

Opponents of economic sanctions also argue that sanctions cannot meet the goals for which the policy was implemented. As the arguments for sanctions illustrate, sanctions are put forth with purposes in two general areas: To alter the domestic situation in sanctioned nations, and to alter the nations’ foreign policy measures that are contrary to the international community’s interpretation of the rules of state behavior. These changes are supposed to be encouraged by the extreme economic downturns caused by sanctions. After four decades of sanctions, Cuba seems no more willing to accede to the demands of the United States. To the contrary, Fidel Castro offered the United States supervisors for a revote in the 2000 elections, a move of mockery. Sanctions have been in place in Iraq for around a decade, and the economic effects on Iraq have been extremely severe. As Daniel Drezner explains, in the six months before the Gulf War, “these sanctions achieved the greatest degree of international cooperation in modern history and cost

⁵⁴ Daniel Drezner. “Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Econ International Studies Quarterly (1998) 42, 709.

Iraq half of its GNP in lost trade.”⁵⁵ According to those who advocate sanctions, these severe economic effects ought to have affected the will of the Iraqi government to continue to defy the international legal standards set up by the nations sponsoring the sanctions. As Drezner reports, the expected result of the sanctions did not occur. Instead, “the Iraqi regime refused to back down, however, and force was needed to restore Kuwaiti independence.”⁵⁶ In this instance, sanctions were unable to prevent a war, much less to change Iraq’s behavior. Sanctions’ association with violence is not a one-time thing, Michael Drezner argues, rather a general trend. He describes economic sanctions as “prone to ‘mission creep’ as the use of force.”⁵⁷ One would think that, as coercion goes, the sanctions and the following war are extreme forms that should have brought Iraq into compliance with the demands of the international community. If these sanctions and the resulting war were not enough to coerce Iraq into compliance, then the United States would try another decade of restrictive sanctions coupled with occasional bombing campaigns to persuade Iraq to allow weapons inspectors into its borders to provide international assurance that its military capability is benign. Still, in 2001, Iraq refuses to cooperate with these demands. The evidence suggests that this extreme punishment has not only failed to achieve its objectives, but has made it less likely that the objectives will be achieved at all. Gause argues that the social problems sanctions bring stop Iraqis from organizing in order to claim their rights and overthrow their oppressors. He argues that “the social disintegration brought on by sanctions is not only a tragedy in its own right, but also diminishes the already slim chance that internal Iraqi discontent could be converted into sustained popular rebellion; people consumed with finding their next meal do not have time to overthrow dictators.”⁵⁸ This argument seems supported by twentieth century history, as there have not been many political revolutions caused by a starving

⁵⁵ Daniel Drezner. “Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion.” *International Studies Quarterly* (1998) 42, 709.

⁵⁶ Daniel Drezner. “Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Econ *International Studies Quarterly* (1998) 42, 709.

⁵⁷ Michael Drezner. “Serious about Sanctions.” *National Interest* No. 53, Fall 1998.

⁵⁸ Gause, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Vermont, “Getting it Backwards in Iraq” *Foreign Affairs* May, 1999.

population popularly overthrowing a wealthy dictator out of belief that the international community would then save them from their poverty.

The United States has long claimed that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein is the ultimate goal of sanctions on Iraq. There has been talk of governmental reform, and of a new Iraqi democracy. However, according to Lt. Col. Susan Gibson, “Sanctions do not have the same transformative power as democratic transitions. Using economic sanctions to improve human rights conditions seems to be a cruelly misguided effort.”⁵⁹ The democratic transition argument for sanctions, she argues, ignores the horrible humanitarian effects of the policy. The picture of people under sanctioned governments that the democratic transition viewpoint holds is fundamentally flawed. This model pictures citizens, upset because their incomes have been stymied, rising up against their government, because a governmental change would ensure the lifting of sanctions. The reality, however, is that the message that it is the government’s fault has not been adequately communicated or convincing to these citizens. Even if this message had been adequately communicated to the citizens, the economic devastation that has ravaged Iraq has depoliticized domestic protest, because people are more interested in survival than politics. Gibson concludes, “Democratic transitions are rarely assisted, and often harmed, by comprehensive economic sanctions.”⁶⁰

Another argument against sanctions concerns their humanitarian consequences. Those who argue that sanctions are a humanitarian disaster ask the question, “under what circumstances can it be morally justifiable for the international community to apply economic sanctions that wreak serious hardship on civilians in a target state?”⁶¹ The inevitable answer to this question among sanctions’ critics is, no. Sanctions have succeeded in wreaking large amounts of economic devastation. This economic devastation has caused social problems in many sanctioned nations.

⁵⁹ Lt. Col. Susan S. Gibson, Judge’s Advocate General Corps, United States Army. “International Economic Sanctions: The Emory International Law Review 13 Emory Int’l Law Review, 161, 1999.

⁶⁰ Lt. Col. Susan S. Gibson, Judge’s Advocate General Corps, United States Army. “International Economic Sanctions: The Emory International Law Review 13 Emory Int’l Law Review, 161, 1999.

⁶¹ Lori Fisler Damrosch. “The collective enforcement of international norms through economic sanctions.” Ethics and International

The documentation about a lack of health supplies and food supplies in Cuba, The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya is not in short supply. The sanctions against Iraq, according to Covert Action Quarterly, "completely severed Iraq's links to the rest of the world."⁶² Iraq's GDP has decreased ninety percent since the beginning of the sanctions regime, and even then the Iraqi economy was suffering from fighting a war. In addition to their economic problems, Iraqi people have been dealing with unprecedented shortages of essential materials to eat, feed their children, and deter disease. Geoff Simons describes the result of the sanctions as genocide. He argues, "What the West has done and continues to do to the children of Iraq is one of the genocidal crimes of the century. Many of us were first alerted to what was being perpetrated when the Harvard study team reported in 1991 that 'at least 170 000 young children under five years of age will die in the coming year' as a result of the war and the sanctions."⁶³ Ten years later, Iraq has lost an estimated two million people as a direct result of the sanctions on Iraq. Feisal Istrabaldi compares the United States' insensitivity to this suffering with its pre-World War II insensitivity to the suffering of the Jewish people in Hitler's Europe. He explains, "We in the United States, along with Saddam and the Ba'athist Regime, continue, then, to contribute to the genocide of the Iraqi people. Non-military economic sanctions must be lifted immediately, lest future generations accuse us of turning a deaf ear to this suffering of innocents, much as our government in the 1930s and 1940s turned a deaf ear to the plight of Europe's Jews."⁶⁴

The argument that economic sanctions cause suffering is widely accepted, even among supporters of the policy of sanctions. As Simons argues about Iraq, "only the perversely ignorant could doubt the miseries of that tortured nation."⁶⁵ Many supporters of sanctions, however, do not know the extent of the suffering. As mentioned above, millions of lives have been ended by

Affairs Volume 8, 1994, 59, 60, 64.

⁶² Roger Normand, Policy Director, Center for Economic and Social Rights, "Sanctions Against Iraq: New Weapons of Mass Destruction." Covert Action Quarterly #64, Spring 1998.

⁶³ Geoff Simons. The Scourging of Iraq NY: St. Martin's Press

sanctions regimes. Before the economic sanctions, many sanctioned nations were relatively prosperous economically. Now, the economic turmoil brought about by sanctions is destroying social networks. The area of women's rights is one where the disintegration of Iraq's social structures is obvious. Human Rights Watch reports that women's rights laws exist in Iraq, and were enforced before the embargo, however, "reports indicate that the application of these laws has declined as Iraq's economic and political crisis persists."⁶⁶ In Iraq, the severe economic crisis caused by sanctions hurts the creation and enforcement of social programs, like women's rights laws. In addition to the legal recognition of their rights suffering, the quality of women's lives in Iraq has decreased as a result of sanctions. A lack of vitamins and supplies makes it impossible to get adequate prenatal care for women. After their children are born, women have trouble finding ways to provide for their families. As food shortages plague families, Simons reports "women typically go hungry to provide for their children and elderly relatives."⁶⁷

North Korea gives us another example of the humanitarian disaster caused by economic sanctions. The sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea prevent food and medical supplies from reaching the already-devastated nation. As a result, a longstanding famine continues to plague the population, though food aid would help. The Dallas Morning News reported "The U. S. Congress estimated in January [1999] that 2.4 million North Koreans out of a population of 22 million have died during the last three years as a result of the famine."⁶⁸ The Dallas Morning news also reported that the government grain piles in North Korea had expired, and that North Korea relies on the outside world for any food. Phillip Hooken Park argues that this shortage is not the government's fault, instead, it is caused by natural factors, such as severe flooding and damaged land.⁶⁹ While the international answer to such a famine is usually to send

⁶⁴ Feisal Amin Istrabaldi. Chicago Tribune 14 December 1998, archived at www.iraq.net.

⁶⁵ Geoff Simons. *The Scourging of Iraq* NY: St. Martin's Press.

⁶⁶ Human Rights Watch, *World Report 1999: Iraq 1999*, accessed 9/11/99 at <http://humanrights.miningco.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport99/mideast/iraq.html>.

⁶⁷ Geoff Simons. *The Scourging of Iraq* NY: St. Martin's Press.

⁶⁸ Dallas Morning News, July 15, 1999, "Nothing to Lose," p. A1.

⁶⁹ Phillip Hooken Park, Adjunct Professor in Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, "The Cause of Acute

massive amounts of aid, the United States' response to this famine has been to maintain the stranglehold of sanctions, forcing North Korea to try to maintain the self-reliance that it has kept up since the Korean War. But in a time when hundreds of thousands of acres are unusable, and the nation suffers from the combined economic effects of a famine and sanctions, such maintenance has become impossible for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Newsweek calculated that the North Korean famine is one of the largest in history.⁷⁰ Teresa Poole reports on the severity of the damages:

'Just in my town, 12 children have died,' says Hyong. 'Many children have died. Many just pick up the earth and eat it,' agrees 13-year-old Lee, who crossed into China in December. Parents are forced to abandon their children, going out to scavenge for food for the family. One boy says 'My father bought some rat poison and carried to use if he were caught. Just in case.' To commit suicide? 'Yes, he nods, sobbing uncontrollably. There are tales of cannibalism, though none of the children we meet admits themselves to eating human flesh. 'We devour people if somebody dies. If someone dies, it's death, no meaning,' says Hyong.⁷¹

People who argue against the utilization of economic sanctions argue that sanctioned nations are not indeed a security threat, that sanctions are overused, that they fail to achieve their policy objectives, and that the humanitarian consequences of sanctions regimes outweigh any benefits of the sanctions policies. These arguments take the form of domestic letter-writing campaigns and protests, as well as international pressure on the United States government. While

Food Crisis in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." The Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 1998, p. 24.

⁷⁰ Tony Emerson, "Where are the Bodies?" Newsweek May 3 1999.

this pressure has brought the issue of sanctions onto the discussion board of policy, it has not substantially altered policy thus far. In the midst of this debate about sanctions, we will insert the insight of a feminist epistemology on international relations theory, as it sees sanctions.

CHAPTER 4. TOWARDS A FEMINIST OPINION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS POLICY

There is not a feminist scholarship concerning economic sanctions. This absence of scholarship begs the question, “why not?” While I do not feel licensed to speculate, I will waste a line or two doing so. The reason that this idea occurred to me, and the reason why this project has been challenging, is that sanctions is a complex issue, an issue that lends arguments to feminists on both sides, and that holds all of the extremes of international policy wrapped up into one little world. Sanctions’ opponents threaten that Iraq will be completely destroyed by sanctions, while sanctions’ proponents threaten that Iraq could wreak significant havoc on the security of United States and other countries around the world. Issues of gender are outlined on both sides of the controversy, as are issues of race, culture, and national sovereignty. My point is that there has been no clear feminist viewpoint articulated on the issue of economic sanctions, and that a

⁷¹ Teresa Poole. “Flight of the Flower-Swallows: North Korea’s Starving Children are Risking Torture and Death by Foraging for Food in China.” *The Independent* (London), May 9 1999.

coherent viewpoint, if it is to be had, must be derived and constructed from a diverse combination of feminist human rights scholarship, feminist international relations scholarship, normative sanctions scholarship, and scholarship concerning the nexus of interaction between race, class, and national power in the international community.

So, this brings up the question, if it is almost impossible to make a conclusion, what conclusion did I make? I believe that a feminist epistemology of international relations would on balance reject economic sanctions as a policy choice. Referencing the four principles of a feminist international relations framework outlined in Chapter 1, we can see how sanctions are critiqued by these principles' ideas. If a feminist evaluation would include broadening the traditional account of international affairs, it would reject sanctions because they privilege security over human rights and the interpretations of the powerful over the interpretations of the disempowered. If a feminist epistemology would prioritize a critical redefinition the treatment of power in the international arena, it would question the United States' right to control the domestic policies of another nation, or even to control Iraqis individually. If a feminist viewpoint would result in the prioritization of the goal of genuine peace, it would reject sanctions as an act similar to war, and against the principles of communication, openness, and cooperation. If a feminist international relations praxis would increase policy awareness of women's rights concerns, it would reject the humanitarian harms of sanctions on civilian women.

Adopting a Comprehensive View of International Political Factors

In Chapter 1, we discussed that the dominant view of international relations is fragmentary and focused on security above other concerns. While Chapter 2 includes humanitarian arguments in favor of sanctions, the argument in Chapter 3 made by Geoff Simons is convincing, that only the perversely ignorant could deny the humanitarian effects of sanctions on the civilians of sanctioned nations. While the humanitarian problems of living under an oppressive dictatorship are sizable, the effects of sanctions are far worse for the people of most

nations under sanctions. The humanitarian effects of sanctions include massive death and malnutrition of infants, women, and other civilians who have no power over or influence related to the government of the nations under sanctions. This trend is an affront to the long tradition of just war theory, as it demands that attacks on nations only target the participants in the offensive behavior or in the war. It is clear that the sanctions have not remedied the human rights concerns that institutions like the State Department; the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Human Rights Watch; and Amnesty International have voiced about the domestic situation in Iraq, as the current reports only indicate that these oppressions have been amplified by the desperate economic situation of the citizens and the government of Iraq. The human rights reports from other nations under sanctions have likewise not improved over a long period of time under sanctions.

The sanctioned nations generally are not responding to sanctions by paying attention to the human rights of citizens. This fact, combined with the rhetoric of the proponents of sanctions when asked about the humanitarian effects, demonstrates that sanctions prioritize security over human rights, marginalizing the quality of life of the individual in favor of some nebulous concept international security. For example, former Secretary of State of the United States, Madeline Albright, was asked if the lives of 500,000 Iraqi children were justly sacrificed simply to allow weapons inspections on the sovereign territory of Iraq. The transcript of that conversation follows:

In 1996 US Secretary of State Madeline Albright was asked by a reporter, *"We have heard that half a million children have died in Iraq ... that's more children than died in Hiroshima. Is the price worth it?"* Albright answered, *"I think this is a very hard choice, but the price - we think the price is worth it."*⁷²

Colin Powell, upon visiting Iraq, was struck by the devastation wreaked on the civilian populace of Iraq. Still, after being witnessing a humanitarian emergency firsthand, Powell was

not willing to lift sanctions, rather to ease them for food and medicine insomuch as that did not interfere with the enforcement of the sanctions against the government. Military concerns trumped humanitarian ideals once again. Many people who were originally pro-sanctions, such as Denis Halliday, former UN representative on sanctions policy, withdrew from their support of sanctions as they realized the devastating effects on the health and well-being of the people of sanctioned nations. In Halliday's case, "Last September he resigned in protest at the effects of the sanctions, stating that they 'undermine the moral credibility of the UN' and contradict the human rights of people."⁷³ Halliday preferred to quit his job than remain complicit.

A broadened viewpoint of international relations concerns, like that dictated by a feminist international relations framework, would institutionalize such response, and at the very least equalize humanitarian and security concerns when making policy decisions.

The United States' sanctions policies are an illustration of how the narrow, traditional viewpoint of those concerns to be included in international relations policy leaves international events "described in the appropriate locker-room or football language."⁷⁴ Newspapers have countless times talked of sanctions as a game between the enforcing United States president and Saddam Hussein, discussing which strategic moves by which star player would result in desirable results. All the while, the star players were eating up the limelight while the real people were behind the scenes, off the field, suffering for their game. Saddam Hussein, I would like to clarify, is every bit as complicit in this part of the narrowing of international relations as the United States is. Likewise, political cartoons show Fidel Castro and a United States leader engaged in such sport as mud-wrestling; the analogy is not as absurd as we would like it to be. As Jill Steans argued earlier, the security v. human rights dichotomy is not the only place where important and serious issues excluded by the tunnel vision of normative international relations viewpoints. This

⁷² Susan Wareham, Medical Association for the Prevention of War "Iraq Sanctions: A Crime Against Humanity." Anti-Imperialist League of Peace and Resistance, accessed 4/21/01 at lai-aib.org/lai/.

⁷³ Susan Wareham, Medical Association for the Prevention of War "Iraq Sanctions: A Crime Against Humanity." Anti-Imperialist League of Peace and Resistance, accessed 4/21/01 at lai-aib.org/lai/.

⁷⁴ J. Ann Tickner. *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* NY: Columbia University

tunnel vision also excludes people of other racial, ethnic, and national backgrounds from the same consideration as United States citizens get. The United States government would not allow a person on death row for the most heinous crime in United States history to suffer the way it allows a five-month-old Iraqi baby to suffer. The government would consider anyone within the United States who was suffering to the degree that Iraqis are regularly, and do something about it. The starvation rates in many sanctioned nations are obscenely high. Instead of striving to fix it, not only do 'we' watch indigenous peoples suffer, cause it, know 'we' cause it, and decide that it is worth the sacrifice. This shows a bias against people outside of the borders of the United States, a bias that a feminist viewpoint concerning international relations would not accept.

Esteva and Prakash's postmodern comments give us direction about sanctions as well. They suggest that any motivation to interfere in the domestic politics of other nations is misguided, because the United States' attitude that the world is a platform to be helped or developed is counterproductive. They criticize that mindset as narrow and closed-minded, as it is integrally linked with the modern conception of the nation-state and power on the international stage. These ideas, Esteva and Prakash argue, are not economically, militarily, or ecologically sustainable. Instead, many of the ideas of the people that the United States spends its time trying to fix are more suitable for survival as modernism's time expires. This argument, despite its complexities, comes down to the same stuff of equality; that is, a feminist viewpoint would dictate that the United States not only equally respect Iraqis rights, but also that the United States equally respect their choices. This meets the postmodernist ethic of bi-directional learning, and the feminist ethic against the patronization of the 'other.' If feminist international relations is "not about vanquishing and transcending according to the rules of the game, but about changing the game itself," a key way to change the game would be to include a wider range of people and considerations in the policy-making of economic sanctions.⁷⁵

Press, 1992, 42.

⁷⁵Anne Sisson Runyan and V. Spike Peterson. "The Radical Future of Realism: Feminist Subversions of IR Theory." *Alternative Vol*

Critical Redefinition of Power in the International Arena

The critical redefinition of power that would be involved in a feminist epistemology of international relations would also critique sanctions. Sanctions entrench the concept of power-over, for example, the United States' power over the government and people of Syria to force them to comply with the United States' wishes. Saddam Hussein's response to the sanctions is also typical of a traditional understanding of power, as the response to an attempt at coercion is to resist it at all costs, even if that means injury to the citizens within Iraq. While proponents of sanctions talk of them as persuasion and leverage, their opponents describe sanctions as a weapon used by the dominant intended to force the compliance of the subordinate. There is a literature that encourages sanctions encourages shunning of many sanctioned governments as an ethical statement⁷⁶, that is, cut off communication as a punishment for the government's misdeeds. This sort of rhetoric entrenches normative power relations, and allows no space of a transition of power to the ideas of acting in concert as opposed to coercion.

The feminist international relations viewpoint would see all nations and people as fundamentally equal. In their equality, nations would not have the ability to exert power over one another in judgment. Simply put, the United States does not have the right to bind other nations by its ethics, as the only way it can do so is its power of its dominance. This viewpoint should not be seen as complicit in or endorsing of the human rights violations that Saddam Hussein inflicts on the people of Iraq, or of The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's military threats towards its neighbors, or of any nation's state-sponsored terrorism. At the same time, the viewpoint recognizes that there are many violences and tragedies in the international relations arena that the United States has been either complicit or involved in, including but not limited to the humanitarian effects of economic sanctions. The "he started it" argument about the ethical

16 Num 1 p77.

⁷⁶ Shunning arguments come from William H. Kanempfer (Professor of Economics at the University of Colorado-Boulder) and Aston Lowenberg (Professor of Economics at Cal State Northridge)'s book *International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective*, as well as an argument of Eric Beversluis, (Professor at Aquinas College) in a *Public Affairs Quarterly* (v3 n2, 4/89) article called "Of Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions, Elliot Abaram's "Why Sanctions are Necessary" in the 7/27/98 issue

excusability sanctions might have been effective ten years ago, but has lost its weight, as the many nations' position on the international norms that sanctions attempt to enforce have not changed. Feminism here does not refrain from behavioral criticism, but rejects enforcement of one person or entity's opinion on a subject via the power-over sort of policy that sanctions is. Like the power-over concept, sanctions are inherently conflict-based. It has been clear from the United States' behavior concerning the sanctions that compromise is not an option, and that the sanctions' game is a winner-takes-all fight. Take up the example of Iraq once again. The United States is not going to lift sanctions unless Iraq cooperates with United Nations' weapons inspections in which the United States is involved; Iraq is not going to cooperate with weapons inspections if the United States is involved in any way. Compromising that has gone on has been minimal, and not really affected the humanitarian effects of sanctions. The oil-for-food program is an example. It maintained the United States' absolute power-over attitude, as the rules were that Iraq could see oil and purchase food if and only if the United Nations could supervise every transaction and set a limit on the amount of money that was transacted. This would allow the United States to maintain control over the Iraqi economy completely. Also, for various reasons, the oil-for-food program didn't work. Iraq no longer had, and was not allowed to import, the infrastructure to get the oil out of the ground; and thus could not meet the United Nations' quotas to sell the oil.⁷⁷ Also, Iraq had difficulty trading the money for the supplies that were needed because the United States dictated what was allowed under the agreement and not. Finally, oil-for-food did not allow individual citizens to trade with other nations, only the government of Iraq. As we have already been over, the government of Iraq is not the most liberal of institutions, and supplies did not reach all of the people. Sanctions put Iraqis in a little cage, and the oil-for-food program kept them there, just dangling a carrot just out of reach.

The United States' power-over mindset is not just evident in its direct relationship with

of the Weekly Standard, and Kenneth Thompson, in his book, *Morality and Foreign Policy*, in 1980.

⁷⁷ This lack of infrastructure is documented by the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report on Iraq, Second Quarter of 1999, as

Iraq, but also evident in the principles behind the institution of sanctions policy for security reasons. The security that is being prioritized is the security of those within the borders of the United States of America, and the quality of life that is being sacrificed is that of people outside those borders. The idea of national sovereignty as the location of the privilege of security is contrary to a feminist interpretation of international relations. While a feminist interpretation would not necessarily abolish the concept of the state, it would reject the prioritization of one state over another. The feminist interpretation would value equality above absolute security for the few, and would value understanding and cooperation over competitive power. Sanctions do not fit this model of understanding of the lack of hierarchy of people around the world.

The feminist redefinition of power, as mentioned in Chapter 1, necessarily attacks the hierarchy involved in elitism, and dominant-subordinate relationships. Sanctions reinforce elitism in two ways. First, nations cannot have a sanctioner-sanctioned relationship without having a dominant-subordinate relationship. The sanctioner must be dominant, as coercion cannot be described in other terms but an attempt to assert dominance to force change. The sanctioned, even if it does not give into the demands of sanctions, is subordinated, as their quality of life and membership in the international community are damaged by the simple existence of sanctions. While the sanctioned may not give in, they are still subordinated by the destruction of sanctions, which they are powerless to do anything about. The dominant sanctioner makes the rules that the subordinate sanctioned is required to follow, or else. And the 'or else' is as subordinating as following the rules. Second, the dominant is fighting for control of the subordinate with the subordinate. Elites compete with non-elites for control of even the most meager things, as power-over is the sustaining breath of elitism.

An ambiguity about the feminist recalculation of international relations' relationship with sanctions is on the issue of national sovereignty. Jill Steans' ideas about the problems of

well as by Stephen Zunes' article in Middle East Policy (v6 n1 June 1998) entitled "Confrontation with Iraq: A Bankrupt U. S. Policy."

sovereignty as it relates to the prioritization of national interests, an area where we clearly can critique the sanctions policy. But this criterion is a double-edged sword, because national sovereignty is the reason that Saddam Hussein claims he has a right to stop United States' weapons inspectors from coming into Iraq and looking for weapons. Still, there are differences between these concepts of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty that the United States utilizes in making sanctions policy is one that prioritizes the possible violation of the sanctity of its borders over the lives of millions of people who live outside of them. The concept of sovereignty that Iraq uses is requiring that another power cannot violate its borders for reasons ultimately damaging to Iraq's security. In other words, Saddam Hussein's claim to sovereignty is on balance defensive, and the United States' claim to sovereignty is on balance aggressive. Also, I think that there is space for a feminist viewpoint concerning international relations to recognize Iraq's claim to sovereignty and not to recognize the United States' claim to sovereignty, even if they were equivalent. Because there is a constant power inequality in international relations between the United States and Iraq, where the United States is always more powerful. This power inequality is a barrier to the sort of interactions between nations that feminist international relations envisions. Recognizing the claim of Iraq while ignoring the claim of the United States would be a transgression against the normal power structures of international relations, a transgression that would contribute to the deconstruction of those structures.

Recognizing that sanctions operate with a power-over mindset of international relations causes a feminist viewpoint of international relations to critique them. Stopping sanctions from being United States policy towards the sanctioned nations will be a step towards changing the unequal power dynamic between the United States and those nations.

Prioritization of the Goal of Genuine Peace

The third principle involved in the feminist epistemology of international relations policy is the prioritization of peace. While, rhetorically, it can be argued that sanctions are in the interest

of peace, the evidence proves otherwise. The argument that sanctions are in the interest of peace relies on the policy existence of sanctions as an alternative to war. The logic of sanctions' supporters is that there are two policy choices in any given situation where sanctions are applicable; those choices are sanctions and war. This argument, however, is substantially flawed. The dichotomy set up between sanctions and war is a false one. First, there are many other policy options: inaction, communication, and cooperation are among them. Second, war and sanctions are not opposites. Finally, the evidence demonstrates that sanctions actually make war more probable than their absence in international policy-making.

Sanctions and war are not opposites because there are many other policy actions that the United States could take, many more peaceful than sanctions. Sanctions are an act of conflict and coercion; the United States could not be said to have good relations with a nation on which it enforces economic punishment. We can envision other policy choices towards nations under sanctions that could be less conflict-oriented. For example, the United States could choose to allow space under the description 'democracy' for the Iranian government as it struggles to combine the old and new and to liberalize its policies. Reacting to the millions of deaths caused by sanctions in Iraq, the United States could accede to international will and send food aid rather than economic embargo towards the malnourished.⁷⁸ In recognition of the peacefulness of Syria's response to being bombed by Israel, the United States could enter into cooperation with Syria in order to establish a lasting peace in the Middle East. At every instance where there is an implementation or renewal of economic sanctions, pro-sanctions advocates would try to convince us that we have two choices – sanctions, and war. In reality, we have at least three choices – sanctions, war, and NEITHER. Even in response to aggression, aggression is a choice, not something that the United States is boxed into a corner and must enact. Seeing that the United

⁷⁸ Robert Kagan in the January 4 1999 Weekly Standard, in an article entitled "Saddam Wins – Again;" Anthony Cordesman, CSIS Fellow, in 1999 publication "Iraq and the War on Sanctions;" David Cortright and George Lopez, in the Spring 1999 Journal of International Affairs, in an article entitled "Are Sanctions Just?;" John Goshko, in the Washington Post of May 22 1999, and the Straits Times on June 18, 1999 agree that there has been a consensus in the Security Council established against the U. N. sanctions on Iraq.

States has other policy options contributes to the deconstruction of the false opposition set up between sanctions and war, and begins to expose sanctions as an act of aggression not synonymous with but similar to war.

That brings us to the second part of this feminist argument against sanctions. The dichotomy that is set up by policy-makers that sanctions are an alternative to war implies that sanctions and war are opposite policy choices. Upon close comparison, however, many of the assumptions, values, and effects that sanctions and war share demonstrate that the policies are actually quite similar. Sanctions create and entrench an atmosphere of competition, of inequality, and of securitization. The results of a policy of sanctions are not only contrary to the feminist epistemology of genuine peace laid out in Chapter 1, but are substantially similar to the violent and coercive atmosphere of war.

Sanctions create and breed an atmosphere of competition and violence. A nation is sanctioned as threat from the sanctioning nation: if you do not comply with our demands, you will be economically devastated. This threat, as mentioned earlier, cannot be interpreted as an act of friendly relations between the two nations, whose relations are from then on governed by the interaction of the aggressor/threatened. This relationship is intensified by whatever offense to international norms the nation committed to provoke the policy of economic sanctions. The aggressor (sanctioner) may also feel threatened by the sanctioned nation in some way, perhaps militarily, or by the potential of terrorism. This two-nation or two-entity relationship is then characterized by threats and mistrust, which is not conducive to the sort of relations that a feminist epistemology of international relations envisions. Under this government of threats and mistrust, there is a constant threat of violence, especially in extreme situations. United States troops remain guarding the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) between North and South Korea, threatening harm to any North Koreans who decide that the border should be crossed. The United States often maintains by military power the no-fly zone in Iraq, and has made it clear to different sanctioned nations that it is willing to act militarily when sanctions do not provide an adequate

impetus for compliance. The sanctioner/sanctioned relationship, then, is not only characterized by threat of economic devastation, but threat of violence intended to coerce compliance with the sanctioner's demands.

Even were there not a direct threat of violence in the sanctioner/sanctioned relationship, it would not be able to meet the feminist epistemology of international relations' demand for genuine peace. In Chapter 1, we described positive peace as involving interaction between and among individuals and groups where such behavior is orderly from within, cooperative, and based on agreement. Sanctions as a policy are incompatible with this conception of peace. A policy that is 'cooperative and based on agreement,' according to a feminist international relations viewpoint, implies equality of all sides in the decision-making process. The nature of sanctions is the government of one nation rejecting the decisions of the government of another nation. Instead of an equal decision-making process, sanctions are the attempt of the government of one nation to change the decision of the government of another nation, forcibly. This shows an inequality in decision-making internationally. The nation that is accused of violating the rules of the international community that are in question did not agree to those rules in the way that Warren and Cody mean when they talk about genuine peace. The nation that is interested in enforcing its opinions is not interested in hearing the opinions of the forced nation on the subject of the offending behavior. This inequality poses a barrier to the establishment of peace, because cooperation is not based on hierarchy.

Another way that sanctions are a barrier to the establishment of peace is through the focus of sanctions policy on security. Sanctions policy prevents peace from occurring by the nature of the motivation for application of sanctions. As you read in Chapter 2, many of sanctions' proponents argue that sanctions must be placed on certain nations to prevent, halt, or discourage these nations aggression against their neighbors and the United States. The United States' priority is thus the complete safety of the people outside of the sanctioned nation before the safety of people inside the sanctioned nation. Under this system, the nations in the region and

the United States will be 'at peace,' but that is only because the 'threat to the peace' is indeed not at peace, but contained, belittled, injured, and battled out of being a threat. The feminist definition of genuine peace is an inclusive peace; one that recognizes that 'cooperation' and 'agreement' does not mean 'cooperation of the majority' or 'cooperation of the privileged' excluding minorities. If it did, it could be translated into 'cooperation of men' excluding wymyn. The inequality between nations and their citizens inherent in the institution and enforcement of sanctions stands in the way of the existence of a peaceful world

Sanctions also stand in the way of the existence of a peaceful world because empirical data shows that sanctions as a policy cause violent conflict more often than they prevent it. Michael Drezner warns that "imposing sanctions on adversaries is like playing with matches: they can fizzle out or they can ignite an unanticipated conflagration. Moreover, economic sanctions are prone to 'mission creep' as the use of force."⁷⁹ For example, whenever Iraq upsets the United States while they are under sanctions, the United States military bombs Iraq. In North Korea, scholars argue that U. S. containment policies have caused a backlash of opinion among the Korean military, making any confrontation increasingly more likely to be violent.⁸⁰ These risks of violence occur because the atmosphere created by sanctions is one of violence and anarchy. In an international arena where a combination of resentment and desperation drives sanctioned nations, and the United States remains prepared and empirically willing to use military force, the prospects for conflict escalate. John Dewey wrote that he understood the policy of sanctions as a response to a threat to the peace and security of a nation or region. Still, he could not understand 'enforcement of peace' as anything but a contradictory concept.⁸¹

Awareness of Wymyn's Rights

⁷⁹ Michael Drezner, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, Boulder "Serious about Sanctions." National Interest n53 Fall 1998.

⁸⁰ David Wright, MIT Senior Scientist, Union of Concerned Scientists, in the March/April 1999 *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, in an article entitled "Cut North Korea some Slack," documents the unrest in North Korea resulting from sanctions. Lt. General Patrick M. Hughes, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in remarks to Congress in March of 1999, entitled: "Global Threats and Challenges: The Decades Ahead," goes over the possible risks of such unrest.

⁸¹ John Dewey, "Are Sanctions Necessary to International Organization? No!" Foreign Policy Association, pamphlet number 82, June

The ‘awareness of wymyn’s rights’ criterion was the most difficult of all of the criteria to apply to sanctions policy in a definitive way. On one hand, within many sanctioned nations, wymyn’s rights abuse under the feminist definition occurs. The Human Rights Watch reports for Syria and Iran tell a story much like the one that Chapter 2 tells of Saddam Hussein; a story of a government that generally ignores the concept of wymyn’s rights. At the same time, there is evidence that sanctions cause starvation and malnutrition, phenomena that primarily affect wymyn, as they try to obtain the appropriate prenatal care and to nourish their young children. Also, the case study of Iraq demonstrated that, there, the government’s enforcement of laws protecting wymyn decreases during the imposition of sanctions. The governments of sanctioned nations are not champion’s of wymyn’s rights, and the United States policy, while verbally championing wymyn’s rights, does not affect them positively. Here, the feminist epistemology of international relations must, at least temporarily, choose the better of two evils, and systematize a decision-making criterion for that choice.

A feminist epistemology of international relations, as framed in this project, would choose against sanctions as a policy when examining it for the ‘awareness of wymyn’s rights’ criterion. It would do so based not on the intent or the means of the policy of sanctions, but on its ends. As you read in Chapter 2, humanitarian concerns are one of the major reasons why sanctions are implemented. The intent is clearly, on balance, more in favor of wymyn’s rights than destructive to the cause. Still, the effects of sanctions are clear. There is no evidence that the existence of sanctions has improved wymyn’s situation in any of the sanctioned nations. Instead, there is evidence that wymyn’s quality of life has generally decreased. Geoff Simons reminds us of the disproportionate impact that sanctions have on wymyn:

Only the desperately hungry *pregnant* woman can experience the anguish of knowing that her foetus is already malnourished, and that her baby will stand a greater chance of being born disabled or dead, and that if it survives, it is

destined to suck in vain on shriveled breasts. . . .
Economic sanctions have produced greater unemployment, making it difficult for women to earn the money not being provided by their warmaimed or absent husbands. So a generation of malnourished women has been driven to scavenging, prostitution, begging, and the black market. Women typically go hungry to provide for their children and elderly relatives.⁸²

While the governments that these wymyn live under may not take kindly to the idea of gender equality, wymyn on balance suffer more from sanctions than they did before such a policy was implemented. We choose the decision-making criterion on this issue as the effects of the policy because it was a place where there could be clear delineation of the operation of sanctions in the real world. Were we to operate with the theory and intent of the policy, a feminist epistemology of international relations would clearly believe that sanctions supported the rights of wymyn. However, looking at sanctions without looking at their effects risks humanitarian disaster is preposterous, as Chapter 3 explained. Choosing to decide in a way that monitors sanctions' impact also brings theoretical feminism closer to the 'real world;' in contact with the people that policy affects.

The first area of feminist international relations supports this choice, as this choice broadens the scope of consideration in international relations theory by prioritizing the actual, as opposed to theoretical, affects of the policy. When we do that, it is clear that a feminist international relations theory and practice holds sanctions to be counterproductive to wymyn's rights. A comparison of the theory and realities of economic sanctions policies to the ideas of a feminist epistemology of international relations theory and practice shows that sanctions are not an acceptable policy choice to a feminist theory of international policy-making. Instead, sanctions are in grave violation of all four of the tenets that we laid out as guiding principles of a feminist international worldview. After rejecting the policy of economic sanctions, the feminist worldview must have some policy to advocate, for the good of policy-making and so as not to slip into

nihilism. Chapter V will explore a skeleton of principles and policies that would work with the feminist worldview to change the United States policies and attitudes towards sanctioned nations.

CHAPTER 5. POLICY ALTERNATIVES IMAGINED BY A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

There are limitations on policy re-visioning generally, and limitations on this project specifically. Generally, policy re-visioning is limited by a lack of empirical experience with the reconceptualization that leaves a degree of doubt as to the practicality of any untested policy proposal. One limitation of this specific re-visioning is its broadness; effectively, it will attempt to address United States policy to dozens of nations around the world, and to give prescriptions to deal with the policies of those nations. Because it is not tailored to a specific nation, this analysis, like sanctions have been in the past, will have to be fit to the specific policy situations of the nations currently under sanctions, and/or of nations towards which sanctions become a policy option in the future. The second weakness of this analysis is that a feminist re-visioning of international relations is much more sweeping than replacing sanctions policy. Were feminist

⁸² Simons, Geoff. *The Scourging of Iraq*, 1996, 131-2.

international relations practitioners to make policy, many of the factors surrounding economic sanctions might be fundamentally different in character, as feminist analysis deals with how nations relate in many ways in addition to dealing with policies of economic coercion.

Those weaknesses being specified, a feminist epistemology of international relations has much to contribute to the reformulation of policy towards nations currently under sanctions regimes. As opposed to a closed policy of sanctions, which has many of the problems outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, a feminist international relations viewpoint would advocate a more open policy. This policy would be based on the four areas of international relations analysis laid forth in Chapter 1, combining those elements into a coherent and clear prescription for the United States' policy. The United States, and the United Nations, to the degree that it is complicit, would have two major, interdependent steps in policy change. The first step would be to halt the abuses that occur in the status quo, and the second would be to institute a new paradigm with which to deal with nations that were under or would have been placed under economic sanctions.

The first step in a policy change according to principles of feminist international relations theory would be to halt the abuses that occur in the status quo.⁸³ In order to begin this process, sanctions would have to be immediately and unconditionally lifted, and removed from the group of policy options available to the policy-makers of the United States and the United Nations specifically, with the ambition that such a moratorium would extend to all other, less obvious implementations of sanctions. Keeping sanctions as a policy option keeps open the possibility of threat and coercion coming from one nation to another. The possibility of threat and coercion diminishes the potential for these nations to act in concert, or with equality. The action of cessation of sanctions would act as a recognition of the ethical repugnance of the institution of sanctions, and a heralding of more equal, more peaceful relations to come. Halting the abuses, however, goes further than simply lifting the economic sanctions on nations that have suffered

⁸³ Note that I purposely leave out the language of 'reversing' or 'atoning for' the current abuse of sanctioned nations, as that is both impossible in scope, and counterproductive to the goal of changing actual situations.

under them. As the feminist analysis tells us, sanctions are a symptom characteristic of the problem of power and coercion in the international system. The problem; narrow and self-serving definitions of the factors relevant to international relations practice, power in the international arena, and peace; must be addressed in an active way in order to put a stop to the problems plaguing the sanctioner/sanctioned relationship.

That brings us to the second step in policy change, adopting a new paradigm for the purpose of making policy to nations under sanctions. This paradigm is formed by turning the four areas of analysis in Chapter 1 into prescriptions for policy-making activity. If a feminist viewpoint would broaden the factors taken into account in international policy-making, it would suggest taking account of the desires of the sanctioned nations, as well as the well-being of people all around the world. If a feminist viewpoint would critically redefine power in the international arena, it would suggest prioritizing the equality of all peoples and all nations in decision-making and treatment. If a feminist viewpoint would prioritize the establishment of a redefined and genuine peace, it suggest dealing with nations that the United States has formerly not been 'at peace with' in a peaceful manner. If a feminist viewpoint would increase awareness of women's rights, it would suggest demonstrating that value in the theory and practice of United States policy towards other nations.

Adopting a Comprehensive View of International Political Factors

This area of analysis of a feminist epistemology of international relations critiques sanctions as having a tunnel vision of the factors involved in decision-making and policy enactment in the international arena. It recognizes that those who institute sanctions fail to adequately and realistically prioritize humanitarian consequences of the policy. It also points out that decisions in international policy-making coming from the United States often make assumptions about the value of humanity based on its nationality or racial background, causing it to choose the potential security of its citizens over the actual death of citizens elsewhere. In order

to change the paradigm of policy-making in which sanctions exist on and abuse sanctioned nations and peoples, these assumptions must be replaced by others that operate in cooperation rather than conflict with a feminist epistemology of international relations.

The first step in broadening the view of international political factors is to recognize the equality of all peoples in all nations around the world, and with that recognition, to become aware that equality of peoples means that each person's quality and quantity of life ought to be given equal weight for the purposes of policy choice. This step will be explicated in a more detailed manner when we discuss a redistribution of power, in the next section. In addition to a shift in the way that policy-making deals with people, it should shift the way it deals with prioritizing policy considerations. Concerns of humanitarian condition need to enter, and rise high in, the hierarchy of policy-making values. A comprehensive view of international political factors would abolish such considerations as 'U.S. Interests,' 'coercion,' and 'deterrence' in favor of such factors as 'human condition,' 'consensus desire,' and 'worldwide benefit.' It is not only to personal wellbeing of citizens of other nations that would be valued by the United States in this situation, but the other nations' interpretations and desires concerning the components and definitions of wellbeing.

A U.S. conception of the rules would be just as imposing as sanctions, telling other nations what they need and want. A cooperative and diverse account, on the other hand, would allow for freedom of choice. These priorities would fit in well with the other areas of analysis of a feminist epistemology of international relations policy to form a policy vision that is peaceful, cooperative, and based on active agreement as opposed to active conflict.

Critical Redefinition of Power in the International Arena

The concept of a critical redefinition of power in the international relations, much like the feminist concept of a critical redefinition of power in the household, is meant to equalize people, regardless of their gender, race, nationality, location, or government in the world. It is a means to

the ends of a process for the establishment of a genuine peace. In a feminist international relations paradigm of policy-making, the United States would treat Cuba as a government on equal footing with its own, though they have disagreements as to the appropriate domestic and foreign policies. In that scenario, Cuba would not be eligible for the punishment, coercion, and force of a power-over policy like sanctions. The relationship of dominant/subordinated (sanctioner/sanctioned) between the United States and Cuba would be replaced by a relationship of cooperators and negotiators, making policy towards one another based on collective agreement. This would require flexibility on the part of both nations in any given sanctioner/sanctioned relationship, but the brunt of the burden is on the sanctioning nation to open the doors to a different sort of power relationship.

Once the doors are open to a different sort of power relationship, the feminist international relations paradigm can replace operation based on power-over with operation based on the power to act in concert. This power can be used to enhance the United States' understanding of the domestic and foreign policy-making of the sanctioned nation, and to be responsive to some of the ways in which sanctioned nations feel that United States policy must change to increase the quantity and quality of lives of their citizens. In this same forum, the United States can bring up the ways in which it feels the policies of sanctioned nations are objectionable, and these concerns can be dealt with in an atmosphere of equality and trust rather than an atmosphere of threats and hatred. While such a transformation would be difficult and time-consuming to enact, and would take quite a long time to make noticeable inroads into decades of hatred and threats, it lays the groundwork for a possible permanent cooperation, or alliance, between nations currently enemies.

Prioritization of the Goal of Genuine Peace

Lifting sanctions, broadening the factors considered in international policy-making, and redefining power all contribute to the establishment of a genuine peace. Lifting sanctions

decreases the securitization of international policy, as well as the chance for actual violent conflict. Still, even a world where these are nominal priorities and there are no sanctions, an end to the inequality of securitization will take other policy steps. The atmosphere of securitization will never be eliminated while United States fighter planes still 'keep the peace' in the airspace above sanctioned nations. Securitization and inequality will be in place as long as the United States points nuclear missiles towards 'weaker' nations, 'terrorist' nations, and 'rogue' nations. In this dialogue about inclusivity, equality, and peace, the United States must recognize that its military capacities and threats are not independent of but interwoven in the practice and psychology of economic coercion and international insecurity and inequality.

Another change in United States policy towards nations currently under sanctions that must be made is a shift to operation by consensus. Consensus operation is easier and more feasible when the negotiators come to the table with open minds, rather than open weapons arsenals. Still, it is no picnic. But the only way to ensure that a power disparity in international policy negotiation fades away is to ensure that there is equality in decision-making. The only way to assure equality is consensus. In this vision, The Democratic People's Republic of Korea would desire that the United States cease pointing a nuclear missile towards its people. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea would explain its reasons; equality, the people's wellbeing, the maintenance of a good rapport, and the lack of necessity of such a measure. The United States would at that time be free to voice its hesitations; the disturbance that The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has in the past caused the international arena, The Democratic People's Republic of Korea tendency to use weapons to gain attention and recognition. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea could remind the United States that they have been claiming for quite a while that any intent to make disturbances in the international arena is over, and that the use of weapons to get attention would not be necessary if its government felt like to world paid adequate heed to the well-being of the people within the borders of The Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This dialogue would replace the current mode of argument between the two nations,

which includes but is not limited to sanctions, weapons threats, bribery, and other forms of coercion. There is even evidence that such negotiations would work with sanctioned nations, should the United States decide to engage them.⁸⁴

A prioritization of genuine peace on the part of the United States would involve stopping posturing, threats, and coercion to find a compromise way to work out its differences with sanctioned nations as opposed to attempting to force those nations to comply with its interpretation of peace. The idea of peace itself would then be borne of cooperation and agreement, as would the ‘peaces’ reached by its process.

54

Wymyn’s Rights

This dialogue between nations would provide an ideal forum for the United States to air desires for comprehensive efforts towards legally and practically recognizing the rights of wymyn. This forum would allow two different spaces for the promotion of wymyn’s rights: by advocacy and by example. Were the United States to achieve a domestic harmony in which wymyn’s voices were truly equal and fully enfranchised, it would be able to demonstrate gender equality in foreign policy negotiation. Absent that achievement, the main space for the promotion of the feminist international relations viewpoint’s conception of wymyn’s rights is through collective contribution to a discussion on how to achieve gender equality in domestic situations. The United States certainly has a less-than-perfect record in this area, as do most nations that criticize gender relations in the U. S., along with most nations that the U. S. criticizes. Hilary Clinton’s wymyn’s conference in Beijing was a first step in this direction, but, as the situations of the world demonstrate, was only the start in a lengthy process of deciphering the components of wymyn’s rights and finding ways to maximize them.

⁸⁴ David Wright, MIT Senior Scientist, Union of Concerned Scientists, “Cut North Korea Some Slack.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, How Can It Be Fixed? Middle East Policy v6 June 1998 (Iraq); USAengage.org (general).

March/April 1999, p.58 (North Korea); Joesph Marty, Ivan Eland, Shibley Telhami, Dov Zakheim “Symposium: U. S. Gulf Policy:

One way to maximize wymyn's rights is through the lifting of sanctions, and other U. S. policies that have a direct and detrimental economic effect on the wymyn of the world. While the economic situation of wymyn is not the only factor in the rights/quality of life complexities concerning wymyn's situation, policies to be evaluated by a lens this discriminating must be examined on a case-by-case basis. Sanctions flunk this test, as they has been demonstrated to economically affect wymyn negatively. After lifting sanctions, the United States can become an advocate, at home and abroad, of true equality for wymyn, and true equality for all.

CONCLUSION

When I set out to complete this project, I decided that I was going to determine whether or not it was possible to guide policy-making with a coherent, uniquely feminist, theory of international relations. At its conclusion, I believe that it is possible, but more difficult than I had originally imagined, and the sound basis for my future academic career. The organization of the project was clear from the beginning: detail a feminist epistemology of international relations, detail economic sanctions, apply the former to the latter. The four principles of feminist international relations theory that I outlined in Chapter 1; comprehensive accounts of international affairs, critical redefinition of power in the international arena, prioritization of the goal of genuine peace, and awareness of wymyn's rights concerns; economic sanctions as a policy do not meet feminist policy analysis' standards. Instead, sanctions are policy based on a narrow, elitist definition of power; a strongest-biased definition of peace, and a misguided conception of how to help wymyn's rights. Sanctions do not achieve their goals, and even if they did, their goals are misguided. Moreover, the narratives included within the text of this paper demonstrate that sanctions' humanitarian harms on the people who are citizens of sanctioned

nations are unspeakable.

It is then the task of a feminist international relations viewpoint to frame an alternative policy space to advocate to the United States government. Chapter 5 has taken up the task of gleaning policy suggestions from the four principles of a feminist epistemology of international relations. Though this task is far from complete, I suggest ways to enact reinterpretations of power and peace. Like most feminist analyses, however, this policy suggestion has as its rock and basis one principle: equality.

If we are not equal, we are nothing.

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